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Multicomponent reactions provide key molecules
for secret communication
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A convenient and inherently more secure communication channel for encoding messages via
speciﬁcally designed molecular keys is introduced by combining advanced encryption
standard cryptography with molecular steganography. The necessary molecular keys require
large structural diversity, thus suggesting the application of multicomponent reactions.
Herein, the Ugi four-component reaction of perﬂuorinated acids is utilized to establish an
exemplary database consisting of 130 commercially available components. Considering all
permutations, this combinatorial approach can unambiguously provide 500,000 molecular
keys in only one synthetic procedure per key. The molecular keys are transferred nondigitally
and concealed by either adsorption onto paper, coffee, tea or sugar as well as by dissolution
in a perfume or in blood. Re-isolation and puriﬁcation from these disguises is simpliﬁed by the
perﬂuorinated sidechains of the molecular keys. High resolution tandem mass spectrometry
can unequivocally determine the molecular structure and thus the identity of the key for a
subsequent decryption of an encoded message.
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In the digital age, data security, in all its facets from every dayapplications via professional environments to espionage, is ofutmost importance. Although ultimate security will never be
reached, a constant progress and improvement of cryptography
and steganography, both evolving with the needs and possibilities
of new technologies on the one hand and the steady increase of
the capabilities of adversaries on the other hand, is required.
A core task of cryptography is encryption, i.e., to convert
messages into unintelligible ciphertexts that can only be
decrypted by a receiver who possesses a dedicated decryption key.
Steganography, in contrast, hides the fact that a message
(encrypted or not) is being transmitted. For a higher degree of
security, decryption keys can be concealed by steganography, i.e.,
via chemicals1–3
The idea to use chemicals for secret communication dates back
to ancient times when secret inks were ﬁrst applied4. Today, more
sophisticated methods are discussed for data encryption, such as
ﬂuorescent materials5–11 or multi-analyte ﬂuorescent molecular
sensors1, 12–14. Furthermore, DNA was exploited for secure com-
munication15–19. Molecular logic gates20–25, molecular computing
systems26–28, and systems based on authorizing password
entries29–38 also contributed to this ﬁeld. Other approaches utilized
NMR chemical shifts39, microorganism colonies40, antibodies41,
3D photonic crystals42, and molecular tags (equipped with halogen
substituted aromatic sidechains) serving as barcodes for the
identiﬁcation of chemical libraries via gas chromatography43.
Considering cryptography, state-of-the-art symmetric encryp-
tion schemes, like the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES, also
known as Rijndael)44, Serpent, or Blowﬁsh can protect data
reliably, but require a secret key for their operation. This secret
key must be known by both the encryptor and the decryptor, and
should be chosen uniformly at random. Typically, secret keys are
short (e.g., 128 bits), but it is not a priori clear how encryptor and
decryptor receive common secret keys. Popular methods to dis-
tribute secret keys involve the use of asymmetric cryptography
(e.g., using the Difﬁe-Hellman key exchange scheme, or a key
transport mechanism based on an asymmetric encryption
scheme, such as, RSA). The disadvantage of using asymmetric
cryptography (besides being considerably less efﬁcient than
symmetric cryptography) is that state-of-the-art asymmetric
encryption schemes require speciﬁc algebraic structures, and thus
may potentially be more prone to a structured cryptanalysis.
However, hiding of the secret key via steganography (e.g., via
chemicals) can introduce an additional level of security. Even if
the number of known chemical compounds is tremendously large
and steadily growing, their application as molecular keys is lim-
ited considering certain requirements: First, a systematic synth-
esis methodology should be applied providing molecules with a
high level of structural complexity. Moreover, simple, robust, and
reproducible procedures should be used. Finally, the products
should be thermally and chemically as inert as possible and be
designed for simple isolation, puriﬁcation, and analysis.
Multicomponent reactions (MCR) represent highly suitable
synthetic tools to provide molecular keys, fulﬁlling these criteria.
In a MCR, three or more precursor components are combined to
one reaction product, containing moieties of all precursors45, 46.
In the ﬁeld of MCRs, the Ugi reaction was appealing, because four
components are combined to a single product in a straightfor-
ward one-pot reaction47. In the Ugi reaction (see Fig. 1a and
Supplementary Figure 1 for the reaction mechanism), an
aldehyde (green) reacts with an amine (orange), a carboxylic acid
(blue), and an isocyanide (red) to from a bis-amide Ugi product
displaying four individually deﬁned sidechains (R1–4, introduced
by the four starting components). Variation of the precursor
components creates molecular diversity with minimal synthetic
effort48–50.
Herein we report a means to advance chemical communication
systems (including the inspiring work of Margulies et al.1), via a
secret communication channel based on molecular keys, which
can be easily hidden in various media, transferred nondigitally1,
isolated via F-tags and unambiguously read out via ESI-MS/MS
(one of the most developed and sensitive analytical techniques).
In our system, the well-established AES algorithm is combined
with an effective hiding and transportation of the encryption key.
The latter consists of systematically selected and tailor-made
molecules that can be transported in a concealed fashion via a
non-digital channel.
Results
Design and synthesis of molecular keys. For exploring the
synthetic potential of the Ugi reaction, an exemplary list of
components (see Supplementary Data 1), including ten
perﬂuorinated carboxylic acids, 50 aldehydes, 50 amines, and
20 isocyanides, was designed. The components chosen for this
database are commercially available and selected in order to
selectively react to the desired Ugi products (criteria listed in the
Methods section and illustrated in Supplementary Figure 1).
This set of 130 components can potentially be combined to
10 × 50 × 50 × 20= 500,000 different molecular keys. The number
of components is only limited by the availability of components
suitable for the Ugi reaction and can be extended easily beyond
this set of commercially available compounds. The main function
of the list of components is to assign chemical information
(i.e., reacting components and side chains of the respective
molecular keys) to alphanumerical codes (i.e., systematic
combinations of letters, numbers, and special characters). For this
purpose, a letter is given to a certain chemical functional
group, and the different sidechains within the same category of
functional groups are counted with arbitrary numbers, e.g.,
aldehydes → letter A, benzaldehyde →A(001), butyraldehyde →A
(003), …; isocyanides → letter B, …). The list of components is
highly ﬂexible, because the alphanumerical assignment can be
exchanged or adjusted if necessary.
As proof of principle, a sub-library of different molecular keys
was synthesized by systematic variation of the different reacting
components, utilizing the Ugi reaction of perﬂuorinated acids.
Considering molecular design, the molecular keys were equipped
with a perﬂuorinated side chain (also called F-Tag), enabling a
highly simpliﬁed puriﬁcation via ﬂuorous solid phase extraction
(F-SPE)51, 52. F-SPE can retain ﬂuorous molecules selectively and
hence separate the molecular keys from organic contaminates
and/or matrix materials.
In Fig. 1, the variation of components is illustrated in a 3D plot
for one of the applied perﬂuorinated acids. Each point represents a
herein synthesized, distinct molecule. The coordinates are linked
to the components used and thus the sidechains of the molecular
key. Two performed systematic component variations, unambigu-
ously demonstrating the synthesis possibility with different
components, are represented in the expansions (Fig. 1c, d). The
molecular keys were analyzed via 1D and 2D nuclear magnetic
resonance spectroscopy (NMR, see Supplementary Figure 2), high
resolution mass spectrometry (HRMS) and infrared spectroscopy
to conﬁrm their structure and thus to demonstrate the viability of
the present library design (synthetic procedures and analysis can
be found in the Supplementary Methods).
Our molecular keys provide a robust steganographic channel that
can be used to transport, i.e., cryptographic keys. The transmitted
keys can hardly be recognized, because (i) an adversary does not
know that a key is hidden in a molecule; (ii) only the recipient
knows where the molecular key is located/stored (i.e., adsorbed on
paper, dissolved in perfume, etc., see below); (iii) information on
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how to extract and analyze the molecule, convert the chemical
structure into digital information and apply the decryption is
necessary; and (iv) since the keys are transferred physically, an
attacker cannot rely on computing power alone.
Data storage capacity is admittedly much higher for DNA than
for synthetic molecules, which might change in the near future
with the development of sequence deﬁned macromolecules53–55.
The user can thus choose the appropriate system for the required
application. Importantly, the molecular keys are designed for
simpliﬁed puriﬁcation utilizing ﬂuorous tags, as well as for
straightforward characterization (tandem-MS), requiring only
trace amounts of the key at all stages.
An exemplary way of key transmission is presented in Fig. 2.
The sender and recipient meet for the ﬁrst time and exchange
details on how to secretly communicate in the future. They need
to agree on how the molecular key will be transferred (e.g.,
adsorbed on paper, dissolved in a perfume, etc.), whether the
decryption key will be fragmented onto several molecular keys
(and if so how many individual molecular keys will be used) in
order to increase/adjust the required level of security. Addition-
ally, the list of components, should be exchanged and the
analytical methods are preselected. These initially communicated
details should remain secret, however, if an adversary reveals one
or some of the discussed details, he is still not able to decrypt the
message without knowing the other information and most
importantly the molecular keys.
Coding, transportation, and isolation of molecular key. The
encryption of secret documents/ﬁles (examples included in
Supplementary Data 2) is performed by an independent state-of-
the-art symmetric encryption algorithm such as AES (herein a
random 128-bit AES key). Currently, people, organizations,
military, and governments beneﬁt from AES encryption for
protecting, e.g., classiﬁed information, email communication,
opening Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnels for secure
internet connections, online banking, or secure ﬁle transfer pro-
tocols such as Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS).
However, the molecular key strategy offers a universal stegano-
graphic channel, and is not limited to AES applications, therefore
opening new perspectives for every symmetric encryption
scheme. The ciphertexts are transferred conventionally in a digital
channel (e.g., via email or even shared publicly) or in a traditional
letter. Decrypting encrypted data without the corresponding key
is infeasible with keys of sufﬁcient entropy. The respective
encryption keys are concealed in molecular keys and transported
non-digitally via a steganographic chemical channel (Fig. 2a) (see
below for transfer examples). The cryptographic digital channel
can, in principle, transmit data of any size. The steganographic
channel for the molecular keys is smaller in terms of data size and
utilized for key distribution exclusively. If the herein presented list
of components is accessible for the adversary, there are still
500,000 possible combinations (~18 bits). For higher levels of
security, the AES encryption key can be fragmented and
transferred onto several molecular keys, which are transferred
independently (spatially- or time-displaced, e.g., the ﬁrst
molecular key is transferred underneath the stamp, the
second one in the top left corner of the letter, and third one is
included in a perfume, etc.). Thus, if six molecular keys are
utilized, the key size equals ~113 bits (100 bits are considered
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Fig. 1 Molecular keys. a Schematic representation of the Ugi reaction. The combinatorial scope of components considered in the exemplary list of
components involves 500,000 molecules. b 3D plot of a set of molecules synthesized with perﬂuorononaic acid (shorter and longer acids were also
evaluated). The axes represent different functional groups. The numbers on the axes represent different components (i.e., sidechains). c, d Expansions of
the two systematic variations highlighted by the red and blue box in b, respectively
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sufﬁciently secure in cryptography). Additionally, such a key
fragmentation increases the steganographic security level, since
an adversary would have to intermit and decode each individually
transferred molecular key.
As a ﬁrst transportation example, an envelope (representative
for adsorption onto paper, see Fig. 3 and Supplementary Figure 3)
was selected. A small quantity (4 mg) of the molecular key was
dissolved in a minimal amount methanol and transferred onto
the top right corner of the envelope with a pipet. After drying, the
molecular key was adsorbed onto the large surface of the cellulose
ﬁbers, not traceable for the bare eye. For further protection and
simple recognition of the area covered with the molecular key, a
stamp (preferably self-adhesive) was placed above the treated
area.
After the letter reached its destination, the covered area was cut
into pieces and extracted with methanol and dichloromethane.
Since the obtained material might contain impurities (which
could interfere with later analysis), the molecular key was puriﬁed
via F-SPE, further demonstrating the major advantage of the
herein used F-tagged molecular keys. The molecular key was
obtained in excellent purity and sufﬁcient quantity for subsequent
analysis (see Methods section). Alternatively, the molecular key
was concealed and transported in a commercial perfume,
adsorbed onto instant coffee powder, green tea, or on sugar
(see Methods section for procedures and Supplementary Figure 3
for pictures). To further demonstrate the robustness of our
isolation protocol, a molecular key was hidden in and reisolated
from a blood sample. If a cryptographic key coded in DNA or
another biomacromolecule was to be hidden in blood, the
ubiquitously present native DNA, proteins, nutrients, and many
other components in this complex mixture can cause severe
complications for the readout. Hence, these successful reisolation
examples clearly demonstrate the advantages of the herein
presented molecular keys. The presented secret communication
channels could be utilized by secret service agencies, for safe data
transmissions in companies or the communication between
individuals or institutions in a totalitarian state regime, to only
name some scenarios that require higher levels of security.
Reading the molecular key via structure elucidation. Analytical
chemistry offers a variety of methods for the identiﬁcation of the
chemical compounds and thus the readout of molecular keys.
The molecular structure is unambiguously solved if the four
sidechains (R1-4) are determined. In mathematic terms, a
four-dimensional problem is solved considering four different
parameters. The four parameters are obtained via four different
molar masses from high resolution tandem mass spectrometry
(the monoisotopic mass+ three fragments). Tandem mass spec-
trometry (tandem-MS) can be applied universally, minimal
sample preparation is necessary and the detection limits are very
small, thus requiring only trace amounts of substance to
synthesize, transport and obtain the information. In Fig. 4, a
representative tandem-MS spectrum is presented, wherein the
symbols mark different species (fragments or the intact molecule)
utilized for evaluation. Fragment assignment determines the
sidechains of the molecular key and decrypts the message. In an
exemplary scenario, the sender would synthesize one or several
molecular keys and determine the alphanumeric code associated
with the chemical structures according to the list of components.
In a particular case, the components perﬂuoropentanoic acid,
4-methoxyphenylisocyanide, pentylamine, and benzaldehyde
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were chosen and converted into A(001)-B(012)-C(007)-D(007).
This alphanumeric code is utilized to encrypt a message or data.
The recipient isolates and analyzes a molecular key via ESI-MS
and determines a m/z of 595.1615 Da for [M+Na]+.
After entering this mass into the analysis script (Supplementary
Software 1), the most probable molecules and their respective
fragments are listed. Fragmenting the m/z= 595 Da species via
ESI-MS/MS generates characteristic fragments at m/z= 176.14
and 106.06 Da, which are entered into the script and are sufﬁcient
information to identify the molecular structure of the molecular
key (Fig. 4). Using the list of components, the corresponding
alphanumeric code can now be generated and utilized to decrypt
the message/data (more examples can be found in Supplementary
Data 2). A detailed procedure on how to read out the molecular
keys is provided in the Methods section. Supplementary
Data 2 contains three examples of encrypted messages and the
tandem-MS spectra of the molecular keys for decryption. Upon
identiﬁcation of the prominent fragmentation patterns, the four
fragments displayed in Fig. 5a were chosen for structure eluci-
dation. In order to facilitate the readout, an analysis script
(Supplementary Software 1) provides the most probable
fragments after the exact mass of the molecule is entered. Since
not every signal from the tandem-MS spectrum is required for the
readout (unlabeled signals in Fig. 4), the analysis script is very
useful for the readout.
The monoisotopic mass is a valuable indication for the
molecular structure. In Fig. 5b, a database analysis based on the
list of components is displayed. The frequency of occurring
masses within a ΔM threshold of 0.01 Da (which is well within
the accuracy of modern high-resolution mass spectrometers
regarding the investigated molecular weights) are displayed in a
distribution plot (more details in Supplementary Figure 4). It can
be concluded that preselecting the monoisotopic mass reduces the
number of remaining possible molecules drastically (at least
by three orders of magnitude). With the fragments obtained
via tandem-MS, the molecular structure is determined and
transferred into alphanumerical codes via the list of components.
The alphanumerical code is entered into the molecular
encryption script (Supplementary Software 2) for decryption of
the sent message. As recommended, the ﬁnal AES code can also
be encoded onto several molecular keys, which are transferred
independently (separated spatially or time-wise). In the case
of these fragmented keys, the individual alphanumerical code of
each molecular key is entered in the corresponding sequence into
the encryption script.
In conclusion, the herein presented molecular key strategy
allows steganographic key distribution in combination with a
ﬂexible and adaptable data safety protocol. Molecular keys with a
data storage capacity of ~18 bit were synthesized in a one-pot
reaction approach. The molecular structures were analyzed by a
combination of tandem-MS fragmentation and computer assisted
readout (analysis script, Supplementary Software 1). The
respective structures served as decryption keys for AES encrypted
messages or data ﬁles (Supplementary Software 2). In principle,
the herein presented keys could also be used for other
applications, e.g., as identiﬁcation or anti counterfeit tags. In
future research, the investigation of molecular keys with even
higher data storage capacities will be of great interest in order to
overcome current limitations of the system.
Methods
Criteria for the list of components. For the list of components presented in
Supplementary Data 1, we decided to exclusively focus on commercially available
components. In addition, only aldehydes were chosen as carbonyl species because
they are more reactive in Ugi reactions than ketones. However, the scope of
carbonyl components reported in literature is larger (but if other functional groups
are introduced they ﬁrst should be tested for compatibility). The components need
to fulﬁll certain requirements (graphically illustrated in Supplementary Figure 1c).
The components should only carry one functional group that can participate in the
Ugi reaction (i.e., a carboxylic and an aldehyde moiety should not be combined in
the same precursor molecule, otherwise polymerization might occur). The
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Fig. 3 Transportation and extraction of the molecular key. The encrypted message is exemplarily transferred in form of a letter. The molecular key is
dissolved and placed in the top right corner of the envelope and afterwards covered with a stamp. After the letter has been sent and received, the molecular
key is extracted with a solvent and puriﬁed by F-SPE to subsequently analyze the molecule and encrypt the message. Additional images are included in
Supplementary Figure 3
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components should not carry moieties, which are strongly redox sensible, photo-
sensitive, or easily hydrolyzed in the presence of protic solvents like methanol or
water. In this context, we additionally excluded tert-butyl esters from our database
because they are deprotected at low pH by triﬂuoracetic acid. Functional groups,
which are known to cause side reactions with any other substance involved in the
Ugi reaction, should also be avoided. In addition, phenolic hydroxyl groups on
electron-poor aromatic systems (i.e., carrying additional nitro substituents) should
be avoided due to undesired side reactions (i.e., Ugi-Smiles where the acidic phenol
acts as acid component). Since the molecular keys are designed for tandem mass
spectrometric analysis, the dataset for one component (same functional group)
should not contain isomers (e.g., no aldehydes with the same molar mass). Isotope
labeled components can be beneﬁcial for MS purposes, but were also excluded from
our database. Diastereomeric mixtures of molecular keys synthesized from racemic
starting components can be treated and utilized similar to stereomerically pure
molecular keys (a study commenting on the inﬂuence of stereochemistry is
included in Supplementary Methods).
General synthetic procedures
General procedure (GP1) for Ugi reactions: larger scale, higher efﬁciency. In a 25 mL
round bottom ﬂask the aldehyde (1.70 eq., typically 1 mmol) was dissolved in a
minimal amount of methanol, subsequently the amine (1.70 eq.) was added and the
resulting mixture was stirred for 60 min over sodium sulfate for the imine for-
mation (if both components were liquid, no methanol was needed unless the imine
would precipitate). The perﬂuoro acid (1.00 eq.) was dissolved in a minimal
amount of methanol and added to the imine at room temperature. The resulting
mixture was stirred for 2 min. Subsequently, the isocyanide (1.70 eq.) was added to
the stirring mixture. The reaction was stirred for 1–3 d at room temperature. If a
precipitate was formed during the reaction, additional methanol was added. If a
long perﬂuorinated chain was present, tetrahydrofuran was utilized in order to
homogenize the reaction mixture. The crude reaction mixture was dried under
reduced pressure and puriﬁed via column chromatography (see General
Puriﬁcation Procedure: F-SPE). Typical yields: 20–85%.
General procedure (GP2) for Ugi reactions: economic, small scale. In a 10 mL round
bottom ﬂask, the aldehyde (1.30 eq., typically 500 µmol) was dissolved in a minimal
amount of methanol. Subsequently, the amine (1.30 eq.) was added and the
resulting mixture was stirred for 60 min over sodium sulfate. The perﬂuoro acid
(1.00 eq.) was dissolved in a minimal amount of methanol and added to the imine
at room temperature. The resulting mixture was stirred for 2 min. Subsequently,
the isocyanide (1.20 eq.) was added to the stirring mixture. The reaction was stirred
for 3 d at room temperature. The crude reaction mixture was dried under reduced
pressure and puriﬁed via column chromatography (see General Puriﬁcation
Procedure: F-SPE section). Typical yields: 2%–35%. The lower yields compared
to GP1 are most probably due a larger excess of components and higher
concentrations favoring product formation for GP1.
General puriﬁcation procedures for F-SPE. For F-SPE separation, we suggest to
utilize 1 g of perﬂuorinated silica gel per 50 mg of mixture subjected (5% by
weight). However, in literature higher loadings of 5%–15% by weight are reported.
Step 1: Flush the perﬂuorinated silica gel with dimethylformamide (0.2 mL per g
silica gel), gently applying positive pressure.
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Step 2: Precondition the column with methanol/water (8:2) (3 mL per g silica
gel).
Step 3: Suspend the mixture to be puriﬁed in a minimal amount of
dimethylformamide and load onto the preconditioned column.
Step 4: Elute the organic fraction with 2 mL methanol/water (80:20) per g silica
gel. We suggest fractionating into tubes of appropriate size.
Step 5: Elute with 4 mL methanol per g silica gel to collect the ﬂuorous fraction.
Note: For long chain perﬂuorinated compounds, additionally elute with the same
amount of tetrahydrofuran/acetone (1:1). Again, fractionating into tubes is
desirable. TLC of the fractions indicates the complete elution of the desired
compound.
Step 6: In order to recycle the F-SPE silica gel, ﬂush with acetone and
tetrahydrofuran and air dry. We do not suggest reusing the same silica gel more
than three times.
After separation, the fractions were tested for purity via TLC, combined and
concentrated under reduced pressure. If unreacted perﬂuoro acid or residual
dimethylformamide were present in the ﬂuorous fraction, a short silica gel ﬁlter
column, eluting with c-hexane/ethyl acetate (3:1) was performed to yield the
desired perﬂuorinated Ugi product.
Note: For purifying the molecular keys extracted from the various disguises 5 g
of F-SPE silica gel were utilized.
Hiding and isolating the molecular keys. The molecular keys can be hidden in
many creative ways. Since the molecular keys are ﬂouro-tagged compounds, they
can easily be isolated from various types of surrounding media. The main
requirement to the surrounding environment or the matrix material is the absence
of any perﬂuorinated alkyl chains. Furthermore, the extraction of the molecular key
should be possible with reasonable effort.
The following extraction examples were performed with the molecular key
A(005)-B(002)-C(004)-D(007).
Adsorbed onto paper: 4.0 mg of the molecular key were dissolved in 0.5 mL
methanol and subsequently transferred dropwise onto the top right corner of an
envelope. Intermediately, the drops were quickly evaporated by gently blow-drying
with a heat gun. For further protection and disguising, the stamp was placed just
above the covered area (see Supplementary Figure 3). For later extraction, the part
of the paper doped with the molecular key (i.e., the area around the stamp) was cut
into small pieces and extracted in an ultrasonic bath with 15 mL methanol for 15
min three times and subsequently three times with 10 mL dichloromethane.
The extracts were combined, concentrated under reduced pressure, and puriﬁed via
F-SPE. In this protocol 3.5 mg (90%) of the molecular key were recovered.
Dissolved in a perfume: 4.0 mg of the molecular key were dissolved in
0.5 mL ethanol and transferred into the same amount of a commercial perfume
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(see Supplementary Figure 3). The resulting solution is more diluted than the initial
perfume, but the dilution cannot be easily recognized by a change of appearance or
smell. The molecular key proved too remain in solution for more than 14 days. It
can be assumed, that the molecular key will not precipitate or phase separate
(because a diluted system is used). For the extraction of the molecular key, the
solution was evaporated under reduced pressure and subjected to F-SPE. In this
protocol, 3.7 mg (93%) of the molecular key were recovered.
Adsorbed onto instant coffee powder, tea, or sugar: 4.0 mg of the molecular key
were dissolved in 0.5 mL dichloromethane and added dropwise onto 1 g of the
substrate powder, each drop was placed onto a different spot and allowed to
evaporate separately. For the extraction, the powder was ground with a mortar and
stirred three times in 5 mL dichloromethane for 3 min. The combined extracts were
and ﬁltered over celite® and washed with 10 mL water twice. The combined
aqueous phases were reextracted with 5 mL dichloromethane twice. The combined
organic phases were washed with 5 mL brine once, dried over sodium sulfate,
evaporated under reduced pressure, and puriﬁed via F-SPE. Extraction yields: from
instant coffee powder 3.4 mg (85%), from green tea 3.6 mg (90%), and from sugar
3.4 mg (87%), of the molecular key were recovered.
Note: For the extraction from sugar no further puriﬁcation via F-SPE was
necessary (fully water-soluble substrate).
From blood: 5.0 mg of the molecular key were dissolved in 0.5 mL ethanol and
concentrated under reduced pressure until a transparent ﬁlm of the molecular key
with a minimized amount of ethanol was obtained. 5 mL of pig blood were added
into the vial and gently stirred for 5 min. The blood should be stored and
transported under cooling. For the extraction, the blood was diluted with 10 mL
water and extracted with 20 mL dichloromethane three times (after the second
extraction an emulsion was formed, hence the second and third organic extracts
were combined and treated separately). The organic extracts were washed
separately with 10 mL water twice. The organic phases were dried over sodium
sulfate (emulsion broke upon drying), evaporated under reduced pressure, and
puriﬁed via F-SPE. In this protocol, 4.5 mg (91%) of the molecular key were
recovered.
Note: The extraction from blood was intended to demonstrate a challenging
extraction example for the herein presented F-tagged molecular keys from complex
biological media. Extraction from biological media would be far more challenging
for cryptographic keys encoded in DNA or other biomolecules. The authors also
want to clearly state that it is unethical to transport molecular keys in living
organisms.
For MS analysis, even smaller amounts of substance are required so in principle
a lower concentration of the molecular key could be employed. However, the
herein obtained mass of several milligrams were sufﬁcient to further conduct TLC,
GC-MS and NMR experiments for purity determination. GC-MS evidenced a
purity of 99%, see Supplementary Figure 5, further indicating successful extraction
and puriﬁcation. After the molecular key has been isolated and puriﬁed, (tandem-)
MS-spectra are obtained and hence the molecular key can be decrypted.
General extraction procedure. If the molecular key is adsorbed on a solid sup-
port, we propose to extract with dichloromethane several times (at least three) in
order to fully recover the molecular key. Subsequently, the dichloromethane extract
is washed with water and puriﬁed via F-SPE. If the molecular key is transported in
solution, we propose concentration, and liquid/liquid extraction with dichlor-
omethane and water. The combined organic layers are dried prior to F-SPE.
Analyzing the molecular keys via tandem-MS. First, the molecular key needs to
be located, isolated, and puriﬁed. Subsequently, ESI-MS provides the monoisotopic
mass (full scan mode 200–2000 m/z), which is used in the computer assisted
readout (analysis script, Supplementary Software 1) to determine the most prob-
able structures. The predominant signals arise from the intact molecule+ sodium:
[M+Na]+ and two molecules+ sodium: [2 M+Na]+ (see Supplementary Fig-
ure 6). The sodium was introduced by utilizing a doped solvent mixture during the
ESI sample preparation.
The next step towards the analysis of a molecular key is to isolate the
[M+Na]+ m/z peak and further fragment the molecule. It proved to be most
efﬁcient to start with mild conditions (low fragmentation energy) and successively
move on to higher fragmentation energy levels (see Supplementary Figure 7). For
the ﬁrst evaluation, a spectrum with many fragment peaks occurring in a wide
range of molar masses (high information density) should be chosen and regarded
in detail (i.e., 30 eV in Supplementary Figure 7 provides a high information density,
since many fragments can be observed and in addition the unfragmented molecule
at 595m/z is still present). However, the chosen energy should be as low as possible
in order to avoid the further fragmentation of fragments. Furthermore, the
observation of heavier/larger fragment species is more likely for lower
fragmentation energies. In Supplementary Figure 7 the respective spectrum at
30 eV is displayed, the corresponding fragment evaluation can be found in the table
below. As demonstrated in the evaluation, it is possible to observe numerous
fragments and hence the information required for structure elucidation from one
single spectrum.
However, in some cases, two tandem-MS spectra at different fragmentation
energies are necessary to observe enough relevant fragments. In Supplementary
Figure 8, two tandem-MS spectra of the same species (731m/z) recorded at 35 eV
(a) and at 50 eV (b) collision energy are displayed. The heavier fragments indicated
by the diamond cluster and asterisk can only be observed in the 35 eV energy
spectrum (a, expansion). The lighter fragments indicated by the black circle and
left-pointing triangle can solely be observed in the 50 eV spectrum (b). The
corresponding fragment assignment is depicted in the corresponding table of
Supplementary Figure 8.
In addition, tandem-MS fragment analysis can distinguish between isomers
(molecules with same mass but different structures). In Supplementary Figure 9a,
two isomeric molecular keys are displayed. These isomers cannot be simply
distinguished by regarding the molar mass of the intact molecule (right-pointing
triangle) nor the isomer fragments. In fact, it is necessary to evaluate the lighter
fragments (black circle and black square), which are unambiguously different. The
respective spectra are displayed in Supplementary Figure 9b (isomer 2) and c+ d
(isomer 1). The spectrum of the other isomer 2 presented in b shows a different
and unique fragmentation pattern, and can therefore be distinguished from 1 (c+
d). The fragment analysis of both spectra is presented in the table of Supplementary
Figure 9. In conclusion, isomeric molecular keys can be distinguished in a
straightforward fashion, if the list of components does not include isomers for the
same component (as stated in the Criteria for the component database).
Computer assisted readout for tandem-MS spectra. The analysis of tandem-MS
spectra at different energies turned out to be time consuming. At this point, a
computer script (Supplementary Software 1) becomes a very useful tool for pro-
viding pre-calculated masses of the most probable fragments after the input of the
monoisotopic mass of the respective molecular key. The mono isotopic mass can be
obtained from ESI-MS spectra scanning in a range from 200 to 2000 m/z (see
Supplementary Figure 6). The script operates as follows: The database of compo-
nents is the basis for the alphanumerical coding (e.g., aldehydes → letter A; ben-
zaldehyde →A(003), etc.), the chemical formula, the corresponding exact masses
and a SMILES code for visualizing the molecule, e.g., A(003) | benzaldehyde|
C7H6O|106.04186|[H]C(C1= CC= CC=C1)=O.
The script then searches for all possible permutations of component
combinations within the entered mass range (reduction of possibilities is illustrated
in Supplementary Figure 4). The mono isotopic mass [M+Na]+ is entered with
four decimals, e.g., 567.5678 and an appropriate ΔM threshold (for the herein
presented examples ΔM= 0.02 Da is sufﬁcient). The resulting possibilities are
listed by the script and the masses of probable fragments are directly displayed.
After entering additional fragments, the resulting possibilities are further reﬁned
until the structure is determined. The fragment masses are entered with two
decimals (e.g., 123.45). If accidentally a wrong number is entered, the REDO
command will return to the initial selection of possibilities after entering the
[M+Na]+ mass. After entering enough fragments, the selection of possibilities is
reduced to one distinct molecule. With the alphanumerical information of the key
[e.g., A(005)-B(002)-C(004)-D(007], the hidden message can be decrypted. The
script also offers the possibility to display more detailed information about the
molecular key via the PRINT command. After selecting the print command a
SMILES code for the target molecule and all precursor components (on basis of the
list of components) are displayed. The SIMLES code can be copied, e.g., to
ChemDraw® (insert with Alt+ Crtl+ P) for visualization of the molecular key
structure (also refer to Supplementary Methods).
Computer assisted encryption and decryption. To supply a full toolchain, also a
script is provided (Supplementary Software 2) that performs the actual encryption
of messages (and the reverse process, the decryption of ciphertexts). The script
operates either in encryption, or in decryption mode. In encryption mode, the
script takes as input a plaintext (either as a ﬁle on disk, or entered on screen by the
user), and a sequence of molecular keys. The molecular keys are then concatenated
and used to derive an AES key for encryption, and the encrypted ciphertext is
output either to a ﬁle, or onto the screen. In decryption mode, a ciphertext and
molecular keys are entered, and the plaintext resulting from decryption is output.
Internally, the script uses the established OpenSSL tool to perform
cryptographic operations (and in particular the key derivation and encryption/
decryption operations). The main task of our script is hence to collect user input,
and run the OpenSSL tool with the appropriate input and parameters. Speciﬁcally,
the script chooses to encrypt/decrypt with the standard AES algorithm with 128-bit
keys (that are derived using a standard cryptographic key derivation function from
the molecular keys).
For decrypting the encrypted messages included as Supplementary Data 2, select
decryption mode, drag, and drop the respective ﬁle into the window an enter the
corresponding molecular key (obtained from the analysis script, Supplementary
Software 1). Please export the messages in the format < ﬁlename > .txt (also refer to
Supplementary Methods). For decrypting the encrypted ﬁle container please export in
the format < ﬁlename > .zip. The solutions can be found in Supplementary Note 1.
Purity determination. The purity of the isolated molecular key [A(005)-B(002)-C
(004)-D(007)] was further conﬁrmed by GC-MS (Supplementary Figure 5). The
intense signal at 11.5 min retention time corresponds to the displayed molecular
key, the integral is 99%. The small impurity (1%) at 10.6 min retention time
originates form a species with a shorter perﬂuorinated sidechain (5 CF2 instead
of 7 CF2), which was incorporated because a shorter perﬂuorinated acid
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component was present in the precursor material (ordered and used as received).
The respective mass spectrum and the assignment of the fragments is presented in
Supplementary Figure 5. However, since the amount of this impurity is very small
we did not observe interference with other analytical methods or the tandem-MS
readout.
NMR characterization. All substances synthesized in the context of this work were
characterized via 1D and 2D NMR. Representative spectra for a molecular key
[A(005)-B(002)-C(004)-D(007)] are displayed in Supplementary Figure 2. Most
molecular keys showed a signal splitting due to restricted rotation (analogous to
peptides), which was conﬁrmed via NOESY spectroscopy (see Supplementary
Figure 2c). In the 1H NMR spectrum (a) split signals can be observed for the
protons on position CH1 and NH6. The signal between 5 and 6 ppm with a relative
integral of two does not couple to other protons, as indicated in the COSY
experiment (b). The HSQC experiment (e, displaying all carbon bond protons via
1J(C–H) correlations) indicates two cross signals and hence two carbon bound
species (CH1) in the respective area. The HMBC spectrum (f, displays correlations
between carbons and protons that are separated by two, three, and sometimes even
four bonds, i.e., in conjugated systems) was utilized to further conﬁrm the mole-
cular structure. The 19F stacked spectrum g of the molecular key (bottom of g)
displays two new AB signals (originating from the CF214 group next to the newly
formed amide bond), if compared to the precursor.
Data availability. All relevant data is included as supplementary information and
is also available from the corresponding author.
Availability of computer codes: All relevant scripts are included as
supplementary information. The analysis script is provided in Supplementary
Software 1, the encryption script is provided in Supplementary Software 2.
Examples of encrypted messages and an encrypted ﬁle container are included in
Supplementary Data 2.
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